Great article! Something to consider regarding 'Comms-Reliant Planning vs. Comms-Denied Execution.' I think Planning and Execution deserve separate treatment in framing Comms-centric model vs. Analog-centric model. How echelons planned, rehearsed, and executed missions during the Cold War and Desert Storm differed greatly in both scope and scale. What is also worth considering what each type is reliant upon differing a critical resources- what is required gets funded. Habitual organizational and operational relationships, ingrained mission and purpose knowledge, and high esprit de corps across the leaders and the led are core resources for mission success in an analog-centric environment. Intel collection, planning, order issuance, rehearsals, and execution must occur in the physical world between leaders and units. Tom Clancy's 'Team Yankee' comes to mind as example how we cavalry and armor units planned, rehearsed, and executed missions in the 1980s and 1990s. Understanding my Mission, Commander's Intent, and End-state- as well as those of my adjacent leaders to me- was fundamental to any version of mission success. Necessity forces resourcing time, material, funding, and training to the need and drives adopting risk to attributes outside the need. It seems as LSCO has returned to the OE, and revisiting solutions we left behind in the information age jet-wash has more than a small amount of merit. I don't have confidence that the US Army could execute an exercise--much less LSCO--with the scope of Reforger '88. Even worse, that applies considering either analog or tech-reliant model. Perhaps the Russian impotence across the Ukraine invasion might hold more than a target of mockery and distain. Cheers.
Really appreciate you taking the time to write this—seriously thoughtful points that hit the mark.
You’re right—planning and execution deserve to be treated differently when we talk about comms-reliant vs. analog-centric models. The Cold War and Desert Storm era—generally characterized by contiguous battlespace—emphasized habitual relationships, shared understanding, and synchronized physical rehearsals—none of which required a chat server to function. That all changed with the GWOT.
And your example of Team Yankee is perfect. What jumps off the page isn’t just the tactics—it’s the mindset. Leaders understood their mission, the commander’s intent, and the end-state—not just their own, but those of the units to their left and right. That kind of shared context was trained, rehearsed, and lived. It wasn’t dependent on bandwidth. It was leadership—without connectivity, but with cohesion, clarity of purpose, and unity of effort.
You also nail the core issue: resource follows PERCEIVED necessity. Right now, the perception is that systems and speed are the answer. So we fund servers, not rehearsals. Infrastructure, not relationships. Software, not trust. And then we wonder why decision-making collapses when the screen goes dark.
That point about Reforger ’88 hits hard. I share your concern—we couldn’t replicate that today, not just because of technology dependencies, but because the institutional behavior that enabled it has atrophied. We’d struggle in either model.
And I agree—Russia’s failure in Ukraine shouldn’t just be a punchline. It should be a warning. Their C2 collapsed when friction hit—and the truth is, we’re not far off from walking the same path.
Hubris has never been a great warfighting trait. But it’s sneaky. It shows up in our assumptions, in our optimism bias, and in our belief that the next fight will accommodate how we like to operate.
I can tell by your feedback that you will really enjoy the next piece!
Thanks again for engaging. This kind of conversation is exactly why Napoleon’s Corporal exists.
Correction. Harold Coyle wrote 'Team Yankee.' Nuts.
Great article! Something to consider regarding 'Comms-Reliant Planning vs. Comms-Denied Execution.' I think Planning and Execution deserve separate treatment in framing Comms-centric model vs. Analog-centric model. How echelons planned, rehearsed, and executed missions during the Cold War and Desert Storm differed greatly in both scope and scale. What is also worth considering what each type is reliant upon differing a critical resources- what is required gets funded. Habitual organizational and operational relationships, ingrained mission and purpose knowledge, and high esprit de corps across the leaders and the led are core resources for mission success in an analog-centric environment. Intel collection, planning, order issuance, rehearsals, and execution must occur in the physical world between leaders and units. Tom Clancy's 'Team Yankee' comes to mind as example how we cavalry and armor units planned, rehearsed, and executed missions in the 1980s and 1990s. Understanding my Mission, Commander's Intent, and End-state- as well as those of my adjacent leaders to me- was fundamental to any version of mission success. Necessity forces resourcing time, material, funding, and training to the need and drives adopting risk to attributes outside the need. It seems as LSCO has returned to the OE, and revisiting solutions we left behind in the information age jet-wash has more than a small amount of merit. I don't have confidence that the US Army could execute an exercise--much less LSCO--with the scope of Reforger '88. Even worse, that applies considering either analog or tech-reliant model. Perhaps the Russian impotence across the Ukraine invasion might hold more than a target of mockery and distain. Cheers.
Really appreciate you taking the time to write this—seriously thoughtful points that hit the mark.
You’re right—planning and execution deserve to be treated differently when we talk about comms-reliant vs. analog-centric models. The Cold War and Desert Storm era—generally characterized by contiguous battlespace—emphasized habitual relationships, shared understanding, and synchronized physical rehearsals—none of which required a chat server to function. That all changed with the GWOT.
And your example of Team Yankee is perfect. What jumps off the page isn’t just the tactics—it’s the mindset. Leaders understood their mission, the commander’s intent, and the end-state—not just their own, but those of the units to their left and right. That kind of shared context was trained, rehearsed, and lived. It wasn’t dependent on bandwidth. It was leadership—without connectivity, but with cohesion, clarity of purpose, and unity of effort.
You also nail the core issue: resource follows PERCEIVED necessity. Right now, the perception is that systems and speed are the answer. So we fund servers, not rehearsals. Infrastructure, not relationships. Software, not trust. And then we wonder why decision-making collapses when the screen goes dark.
That point about Reforger ’88 hits hard. I share your concern—we couldn’t replicate that today, not just because of technology dependencies, but because the institutional behavior that enabled it has atrophied. We’d struggle in either model.
And I agree—Russia’s failure in Ukraine shouldn’t just be a punchline. It should be a warning. Their C2 collapsed when friction hit—and the truth is, we’re not far off from walking the same path.
Hubris has never been a great warfighting trait. But it’s sneaky. It shows up in our assumptions, in our optimism bias, and in our belief that the next fight will accommodate how we like to operate.
I can tell by your feedback that you will really enjoy the next piece!
Thanks again for engaging. This kind of conversation is exactly why Napoleon’s Corporal exists.
— Napoleon’s Corporal
“Not easy, but simple.”